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INTRODUCTION
The patent system, university medical systems, and federal research funding,
come together to provide a complicated set of incentives to promote medical R&D.
Pharmaceutical and medical device innovations are provided mostly by the private sector
and depend heavily on patent protection. Medical and surgical procedure innovations are
provided mostly by the public sector and largely outside the domain of the patent system.
This division of labor is not rigid. Private sector R&D often builds on basic research
funded by the government and conducted in universities. Universities obtain patents, use
private sector funds, and enter ventures with private companies for medical R&D. Not
much is known about the optimal mix of public and private incentives for encouraging
medical R&D. This Article takes a step in that direction by analyzing the effect of these
incentives on medical R&D in the new field of pharmacogenomics.
Pharmacogenomics is the application of genomics to drug therapy.1 Medical
researchers hail the progress of genomics research and proclaim its potential for
revolutionizing drug therapy. With luck, we will soon enjoy the benefits of customized
drugs prescribed in optimal dosage with minimized side effects. This revolution is
grounded in the belief that much of the variation in patient response to drugs is
determined by measurable genetic variation in patients. New genetic tests and knowledge
of the links between genes and drug response will make better drug therapy possible.
Thus far, public sector funding and R&D have been critical to the creation and
deployment of pharmacogenomic innovations.2 As the field matures, much innovative
activity will probably shift to the private sector. In particular, drug patent owners are
likely to generate most future innovation in this field. One reason is that
pharmacogenomic research is likely to become a routine part of the drug discovery
process, and the development of genetic tests will be ancillary to drug development.
Another reason is that genetic tests may be able to resuscitate patented drugs that were
*

Associate Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law, meurer@bu.edu. I thank participants at
the Washington University Conference on the Human Genome Project and IP Law (April 2002) for their
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1
Pharmacogenomics also plays a role in drug research and development. This Article focuses mainly on
the drug therapy application of pharmacogenomics. Some authors distinguish between pharmacogenetic
and pharmacogenomic approaches to drug therapy, the distinction is not important for my purposes. See
Allen Buchanan, Andrea Califano, Jeffrey Kahn, Elizabeth McPherson, John Robertson, & Baruch Brody,
Pharmacogenetics: Ethical Issues and Policy Options, 12 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 1, 1-2 (2002).
2
Cf. Antonio Regalado, Mining the Genome, 102 TECHNOLOGY REV. 56, 63 (1999) (the NIH recommends
significantly increased support for computational biology in American universities).
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abandoned because of problems with adverse reactions. Nevertheless, it may be desirable
to continue public sector support of pharmacogenomics.
Patents do not always provide adequate private incentives to develop genetic tests.
Genetic tests designed to improve therapy with existing drugs might be underprovided by
the private sector. Private incentives may be too low because private returns are low
relative to social returns, and because private costs are high relative to social costs. The
main contribution of this Article is an analysis of the private and social returns to
pharmacogenomic innovation in markets for existing patented drugs. Introducing genetic
tests could increase or decrease the profit from patented drugs that are used in
conjunction with the tests. Similarly, social value could rise or fall after tests are
introduced. I will try to identify factors that cause private returns to fall below social
returns.
Social value generated in the market for a patented drug tends to rise with the
introduction of a genetic test because of the social benefit from better matching between
patients and drugs. Social value is also influenced by the change in sales of the patented
drug caused by testing. The introduction of testing can decrease sales because of a price
increase that pushes untested patients out of the market. But testing can also increase
sales, for example when the test avoids harmful side effects and makes a drug newly
available.
The introduction of a genetic test unambiguously increases profit from the sale of
an associated patented drug in cases in which the drug cannot be marketed absent the test.
This might occur because the drug has severe side effects for a subset of patients that
cannot be identified without the test. This might also occur if the drug is efficacious for
only a small subset of patients. Testing also increases profit in a market in which
duopolists offer drugs that are imperfect substitutes. Testing raises profit to each firm
through two different effects. First, testing allows doctors to better match patients with
one of the two drugs; this leads to higher demand for each of the drugs.3 Second, testing
differentiates the two drugs and gives more market power to each of the two firms.
The introduction of a genetic test might decrease monopoly profit from the sale of
a patented drug that is marketed even without the test. Profit might fall because certain
patients learn they are not well matched with the drug and so they drop out of the market.
This effect may be offset if the drug maker is able to increase price enough. Genetic tests
can also hurt profits from the sale of drugs because the tests give private information to
patients about their valuation for the drugs. Private information can increase consumer
bargaining power and reduce seller profit.
In addition to direct threats to drug profit, the private sector incentive to invent
genetic tests might be too weak for two other reasons. First, the use of more than one
patented drug might be influenced by a single genetic test. In this case, a test that has a
favorable effect on the profitability of each drug is a kind of a public good that is apt to
be underprovided.4 Second, the private costs of genetic test innovation are likely to be
3

This statement is true if the two drugs serve a roughly equal market share after testing. It is possible that
the profits from one drug will fall if the genetic tests reveal that most patients are better matched with the
other drug.
4
This is true even though the test and the affected drugs are all patented. Some tests will inherently reveal
information relevant to more than one drug, and the test patent owner will not be able to selectively
disclose that information.
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higher than the social costs, because the private costs of licensing database access and
rights to patented research tools are mere transfers that do not count as social costs.
The existence of independent diagnostic firms who compete with drug patent
owners to develop genetic tests is a factor weighing against public sector R&D.
Competition to get a patent is a potent stimulant of innovation that can more than offset
problems appropriating the full social value of a genetic test. Independent inventors have
an incentive to invent genetic tests based on the prospective profit from the sale or
licensing of the tests, or from the assignment of the patent on the test to a drug patent
owner.5 Drug patent owners are likely to acquire such patents because drugs and genetic
tests are complements that are marketed most efficiently by a single firm. Normally, drug
patent owners have a strong and socially optimal incentive to push for broad adoption of
genetic tests. But there are cases in which profit maximization requires suppression of a
genetic test — surprisingly, such suppression can be socially desirable.6
I. PHARMACOGENOMICS AND THE PROMISE OF CUSTOMIZED DRUG
THERAPY
Genomics is the study of the function and structure of genes and gene products.7
It has become a vital new research tool of life science industries; one that promises more
efficient drug research and development. This efficiency arises because genomics
improves the understanding of the disease process;8 helps identify drug targets;9 guides
drug design;10 and ultimately reduces the cost and increase the success rate of R&D.11
5

Independent inventors are likely to face obstacles when competing with drug patent owners when they
control access to drugs and clinical data in a way that discourages independent inventors from developing a
genetic test.
6
Part III discusses the diffusion of genetic tests. There are a variety of factors outside the scope of my
model that will affect the profit and social value from use of genetic tests.
7
See U.S. Dept. of Energy Human Genome Program, Genomics and Its Impact on Science and Society:
The
Human
Genome
Project
and
Beyond,
March
2003,
available
at:
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/glossary/glossary_p.html, (last visited April 18,
2003).
8
See id. at: http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/publicat/primer2001/6.html.
9
See Allen D. Roses, Pharmacogenetics and the Practice of Medicine, 405 NATURE 857 (2000); Comment:
Panning For Biotechnology Gold: Reach-Through Royalty Damage Awards For Infringing Uses Of
Patented Molecular Sieves, 39 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 553, 554 (1999) (describing high-throughput screening
of drug candidates); Regalado, supra note 2, at 63 (gene expression profiles help predict toxic effects from
a drug candidate which allows researchers to exclude losers at an early stage).
10
See U.S. Dept. of Energy Human Genome Program, supra note 7, at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/publicat/primer2001/6.html.
11
See e.g., Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What's Right With It, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 304, 339 (1999) (Phamacogenomics will reduce the cost of research and development
of the drugs because of the ability to pinpoint the population which would be effected by the drug.); James
Kling, Opportunities Abound in Pharmacogenomics, THE SCIENTIST, (May 10, 1999) available at:
http://www.the-scientist.com/yr1999/may/prof_990510.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (New hardware
devices will cut drug development costs by providing genetic information at a lower cost and in less time.);
Andrew Pollack, DNA Chip May Help Usher in a New Era of Product Testing, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000,
www.nytimes.com/2000/11/28/science/28TOXI.html (Toxicogenomics aims to judge the toxicity of food
additives, drugs, and cosmetics by using gene chips to measure the pattern of gene activity in response to
exposure to a chemical. If this method is successful it should reduce the cost of testing.); Arti Kaur Rai, The
Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in
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Genomics also has great potential as applied to drug therapy. This branch of genomics,
called pharmacogenomics, is less developed than the application to drug discovery, but it
may be just as significant.
A. Genomics and the Practice of Medicine
Pharmacogenomics promises tailored medicine. Future doctors are likely to
routinely collect genetic information from patients who need medication so they can
avoid adverse drug reactions, and select the optimal medication and dosage.12 Genetic
differences between patients apparently explain why some patients but not others suffer
from harmful drug side effects.13 Research is under way to devise genetic tests that will
help doctors avoid fatal side effects from an AIDS drug,14 severe diarrhea from a
chemotherapy drug,15 and allergic reactions to penicillin.16 Genetic testing could also
soon be used to exclude certain patients from receiving a drug because the patients’
metabolism renders the drug ineffective.17 Someday, doctors are likely to test the genetic
make-up of tumors, viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens18 and use the results to select
the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 189-90 (2001) (Genomics promises faster and cheaper
pre-clinical drug research).
12
See Roses, supra note 9; U.S. Dept. of Energy Human Genome Program, supra note 7, at:
www.ornl.gov/hgmis/medicine/pharma.html (“Pharmacogenomics is the study of how an individual’s
genetic heritance affects the body’s response to drugs. Pharmacogenomics holds the promise that drugs
might one day be tailor-made for individuals and adapted to each person's own genetic makeup.
Environment, diet, age, lifestyle, and state of health all can influence a person's response to medicines, but
understanding an individual's genetic makeup is thought to be the key to creating personalized drugs with
greater efficacy and safety.”). But see John Robertson, Baruch Brody, Allen Buchanan, Jeffrey Kahn, &
Elizabeth McPherson, Pharmacogenetic Challenges for the Health Care System, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 155,
157 (2002) (not yet clear that genetic effects are significant and predictable enough to significantly change
drug therapy).
13
See Laviero Mancinelli, Maureen Cronin, & Wolfgang Sadee, Pharmacogenomics: The Promise of
Personalized
Medicine,
AAPS
PHARMACUETICA,
(March
7,
2000)
available
at:
www.pharmsci.org/scientificjournals/pharmsci/journal/4.html> (last visited Mar. 27, 2002); but see Lars
Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients' Genetic Profiles, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 10 (2002) (cautioning that not all adverse drug reactions will be prevented by
pharmacogenomics).
14
See Mark Schoofs, AIDS-Drug Side Effect Linked to Genes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2002, B2. (Scientists
have shown that people with certain genetic patterns are vulnerable to potentially fatal side effects from a
leading AIDS drug.)
15
See id. (A company is developing a genetic test that will screen out patients who suffer severe diarrhea
from a chemotherapy drug called irinotecan.)
16
See Pollack, supra note 11 (Scientists have found 260 genes that are differentially activated in people
allergic to penicillin compared to people who are not.)
17
See John Weinstein, Pharmacogenomics--Teaching Old Drugs New Tricks, 343 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1408 (2000) (SNPs affecting drug metabolism explain why certain drugs are not effective in treating a
subset of patients); David Stipp, Blessing From the Book of Life, 141 FORTUNE F-21, 24, Mar. 6, 2000 (a
SNP chip will be able to determine that a medication will not work on a particular patient whose liver
enzymes break down the medication too quickly).
18
See Regalado, supra note 2, at 62 (scientists have distinguished two types of leukemia solely by
comparing the gene expression profiles for cells affected by the two types of leukemia); Stipp, supra note
16, at F-21, 24 (gene chips will be able to distinguish different types of T-cell cancers); Andrew Pollack,
Telling the Threatening Tumors from the Harmless Ones, N. Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2002, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/09/science/09GENE.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2002) (the National Cancer
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appropriate medications.19 Finally, future doctors are likely to use genetic information
about patients’ metabolism to tailor the appropriate dosage and schedule for
administering drugs.20
B. Genetic Testing Technology
Genetic testing is likely to be deployed in three different ways to facilitate the
practice of pharmacogenomics. First, preventive screening will identify genes that cause
or have an association with a disease.21 Ideally, preventive screening will be coupled with
preventive treatment of patients facing elevated risk of disease.22 Second, general purpose
testing will produce information relating to drug metabolism and potential adverse drug
reactions.23 Third, specific genetic testing of diseased cells and pathogens will improve
the precision of tailored drug therapy.24
Institute and Merck are developing a test based on a genetic fingerprint that distinguishes breast cancer that
requires chemotherapy from breast cancer that does not). “Children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia, for
instance, already undergo several separate tests costing about $1,000 to help subclassify the cancer to help
determine therapy, he said. But in a newly published study involving 327 patient samples, one of the largest
DNA chip studies to date, Dr. Downing and colleagues showed that the genetic patterns could classify the
cancers as accurately as all the other tests combined, if not more so.” Id. “Millennium Pharmaceuticals …
has found that if a particular gene in a melanoma skin tumor is inactive, the tumor is more likely to spread
throughout the body.” Id.
19
See Andrew Pollack, When Gene Sequencing Becomes a Fact of Life, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001,
available at: www.nytimes.com/2001/01/17/business/17AIDS.html (sequencing HIV can help a doctor
choose from among 15 drugs available to fight AIDS).
20
See U.S. Dept. of Energy Human Genome Program, supra note 7.
21
Patients can be screened for particular mutations like BRCA1 and BRCA2, and for markers, called SNPs,
that are linked with genes that are implicated in some disease. See Allen C. Nunnally, Commercialized
Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate Biotechnology in the New Genetic Age, 8 J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 12
(2001);
U.S.
Dept.
of
Energy
Human
Genome
Program,
supra
note
7,
at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/publicat/primer2001/6.html (several hundred genetic
tests are currently in use mainly to detect rare genetic disorders).
22
But see Gina Kolata, Test Proves Fruitless, Fueling New Debate on Cancer Screening, N.Y. TIMES, April
9, 2002, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/09/science/09CANC.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2002) (describing the debate among oncologists about the value of cancer screening tests and the problem
of false positives).
23
See LORI B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND
POLICY 423 (2002) (genetic test that helps determine how patients metabolize a variety of drugs); National
Institute
of
General
Medical
Sciences,
Your
Genes
and
Your
Medicines,
http://www.nigms.nih.gov/funding/htm/yrgenes2.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002). (“In most cases,
research to find normal variations in the genes for the proteins that handle medicines in the body will
involve a simple test. In many cases, researchers will rub the inside of a volunteer’s cheek with a cotton
swab and then examine the DNA in those cheek cells.”); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in
the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 813, 842 (2001)
(SNP gene chips will be used to predict adverse drug reactions). Kathleen Giacomini, PhD, professor and
chair of biopharmaceutical sciences in UCSF’s School of Pharmacy predicts: “[I]n the future, you may go
in for a doctor’s visit and have your blood drawn for a genotype to be done which would indicate what
genes you have for drug transporters, drug targets, or drug elimination enzymes. Then after you are
diagnosed, a pharmacist could interpret the panels of genetic results and advise on which drugs would be
‘best’ for your particular genes.” What Is Pharmacogenomics? IMPACT: THE UCSF FOUNDATION’S ONLINE
MAGAZINE, available at: http://www.ucsf.edu/foundation/impact/archives/1999/17_pharmacog.html (last
visited Mar. 26, 2002).
24
See supra note 18.
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Genetic testing technology captures two different kinds of data: gene sequence
data, and gene expression data. Gene sequence testing reveals selective information about
the DNA of a tested patient or the DNA of a pathogen. For example, Myriad Genetics
makes a test of human DNA that detects the presence of mutated genes that cause a form
of inherited breast cancer.25 Visible Genetics developed a sequencing test of the HIV
virus that helps tailor prescription of AIDS drugs.26 Companies are working to develop a
low-cost method capable of sequencing a patient’s entire genome.27 Such tests are
necessary before pharmacogenomics can achieve its full potential.
Besides gene sequence data, doctors also need to know which genes are active in
particular cells. This information is obtained by observing the messenger RNA (mRNA)
produced in a cell. The mRNA is an essential intermediary in the production of protein in
a cell. Biologists say that a gene is expressed when the cell produces the protein that the
gene encodes. A newly developed device that marries microchip technology with
molecular biology produces gene chips that monitor gene expression. These gene chips
work by detecting all of the mRNA present in a cell; this information gives a snapshot of
what genes are being expressed and in what quantity.28 The data from the gene chip is
called a gene expression profile. This profile has therapeutic value when it is correlated
with optimum drug therapy.29
Before routine pharmacogenomic therapy becomes a reality many factors must
fall into place.30 Doctors and patients must have access to kits and equipment to sequence
genes or produce gene expression profiles.31 Several companies have shown an interest in
producing kits and equipment,32 but it is not yet clear how willing health care providers
are to pay for these items.33 Equally important, doctors and diagnostics manufacturers
25

See Rita Rubin, To Test, or Not to Test, for Breast Cancer Genes, USA TODAY.COM (Jan. 10, 2002)
available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/cancer/2002-01-09-usat-breastcancer-gene.htm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2003).
26
See Chael Needle, Gene Genie: Visible Genetics Makes Good on the Wish for Better Resistance Testing
Technology, A&U
America’s
AIDS
Magazine
(Apr. 17,
2003) available at:
http://www.aumag.org/www_aumag_org/archives/archives_contents.cfm?a_id=3730&c_id=86 (last visited
April 17, 2003).
27
See David Orenstein, A Genetic Hole in One: David Deamer's “Nanopore” Device Might Eventually
Allow Doctors to Decode Your DNA — While You Wait, Business2.0 (October 2001) available at:
http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,16900,FF.html (last visited April 17, 2003).
28
See Regalado, supra note 2, at 59-62 (DNA chips identify a gene expression profile for a cell, the gene
chips recognize the type and quantity of mRNA in a cell to get a snapshot of what proteins are being
expressed in a cell).
29
Predicting that in the future “each drug [will] be bundled with a specific set of diagnostic tests for those
positions in the human genome which alter drug response.” Charles R. Cantor, 1 GENELETTER 3 April 2000
available at http://www.geneletter.org/04-01-00/features/pharmacogenomics.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2002).
30
See Personal Pills: Genetic Differences May Dictate How Drugs Are Prescribed, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN,
available at: http://www.sciam.com/1998/1098issue/1098infocus.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (William
Haseltine the CEO of Human Genome Sciences warns that diagnostic tests can be unreliable in part
because environmental factors have a significant influence on drug behavior).
31
See Andrew Pollack, When Gene Sequencing Becomes a Fact of Life, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001,
www.nytimes.com/2001/01/17/business/17AIDS.html (the company Visible Genetics plans to give away
small sequencing machines to clinical laboratories, hospitals, and doctors’ offices, and make a profit from
the sale of kits required to do a test).
32
See ANDREWS, ET AL., supra note 23, at 423 (listing three gene tests that will soon be available).
33
See infra notes 41 and x.
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must have access to theories and data that yield improved drug therapies.34 The public
and private sectors have both started producing the data and compiling the databases that
are required for genomic research.35 As genomics plays a bigger role in drug research,
theories about disease mechanisms and the links between genes and diseases will
frequently emerge during drug R&D.36 Theories linking genetic data to drug therapy will
also be produced by academic researchers and diagnostic companies interested in making
and selling genetic tests.37
II. THE IMPACT OF GENETIC TESTS ON PROFIT AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN
THE MARKET FOR EXISTING DRUGS
A. The Basic Model
The market for prescription drugs is difficult to model because of the complicated
relationship between the patient who demands the drug and the pharmaceutical company
that sells the drug. Typical patients have relatively little to say about the variety or
quantity of drug they will purchase. Instead that choice is made by a doctor acting on
behalf of the patient facing possible constraints imposed by the party who pays for the
drug, the pharmacist, and government regulations.38 Despite these complications,
economists have had some success analyzing this market in a traditional framework.39 To
keep my model simple, I assume that a doctor will prescribe drugs in a way that
maximizes the utility of the patient.
In the basic model, a patented drug is given to a patient population; it is effective
for half of the population and has no effect on the other half. Suppose that a genetic test is
34

Some observers are skeptical about rapid progress in the application of genomics to medicine. See e.g.,
Leslie Roberts, SNP Mappers Confront Reality and Find It Daunting, 287 SCI. 1898 (2000); Neil A.
Holtzman & Theresa M. Marteau, Will Genetics Revolutionize Medicine? 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 141
(2000).
35
See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 77, 146 (1999) (American universities have reached a consensus that SNPs
data should be dedicated to the public domain through a public database.); Scientific American, supra note
30 (The firm Genset has created a private database of 60,000 SNPs that mark genes that cause disease or
differing drug reactions).
36
The drug company Abbot will use the Genset SNP database during clinical trials to identify patients who
do not respond to tested drugs. They will then turn these results into a diagnostic test to screen out patients
who do not respond. See Scientific American, supra note 30. Drug companies monitor the effect of
approved drugs on patients; in the future this monitoring will produce information that aids tailored drug
therapy. See Roses supra note 9.
37
See Rob James, Differentiating Genomics Companies, 18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 153, 155 (2000)
(The company Gene Logic has developed a database of gene expression profiles for normal cells that can
be compared to the gene expression profiles for diseased cells, and cells exposed to toxic substances.);
Associated
Press,
Miami
Herald,
Mar.
25,
2002,
available
at:
http://www.miami.com/mld/miami/business/2932460.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (IBM and the Mayo
Clinic plan to create a medical database including 4 million patient records and genetic data from the
patients.)
38
See Sarah Ellison, Iain Cockburn, Zvi Griliches, and Jerry Hausman, Characteristics of Demand for
Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins, 28 RAND J. ECON. 426 (1997).
39
See e.g., id. (showing the demand for drugs is sensitive to price by presenting evidence of high crossprice elasticity in demand for brand-name drugs with generic substitutes, and significant elasticities for
therapeutic substitutes).
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available that can identify whether a particular patient will gain a benefit from use of the
drug. Suppose that a fraction α of the population is given the test. One-half of those
tested will be a “good match” and gain a benefit V from use of the drug. The other half
will be a “bad match” and gain no benefit from the drug.40 The remaining fraction 1 - α
of the population will be uninformed about how well they match with the drug and gain
an expected benefit of V/2 from use of the drug. The following table summarizes the
information about patient types, probabilities, and valuations.
Probability
Valuation

Uninformed
1-α
V/2

Good Match
α/2
V

Bad Match
α/2
0

Table One
Suppose that the drug maker sets a uniform price for the drug. The seller knows
the information in the Table One, but does not know whether a particular patient is
uninformed, a good match, or a bad match. The seller incurs a constant marginal cost of
C from the production and distribution of the drug where C < V/2. The profit maximizing
price depends on the value ofα. If no patients are informed, then all patients have a
valuation of V/2 and the monopoly price is V/2. If all the patients are informed, then only
good matches will purchase, and the monopoly price is V.41 If there is a mix of informed
and uninformed patients, then the monopoly price is V/2 if the fraction informed is
sufficiently small, and the monopoly price rises to V when the fraction informed is
sufficiently large.
The profit to the seller from setting a price of V/2 is
π = (1 – α/2) (V/2 – C),
and the profit to the seller from setting a price of V is
π = α/2 (V – C).
The optimal price is V/2 when α ≤ α0, and V otherwise, where

α0 =

2V – 4C .
3V – 4C

Figure 1 displays profit and total surplus using solid lines (the bold line is relevant to the
version of the model analyzed in the next section). The figure shows that the profit to the
seller falls as the fraction of informed grows as long as the fraction informed,α, is less
40

After the introduction pharmacogenomics, drugs which are currently prescribed to almost all patients will
be prescribed only to those patients with a genetic profile indicating drug effectiveness. See Pulsinelli,
supra note 11, at 339.
41
See Noah, supra note 13, at 18 (making similar observation). But see Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse,
The Economics of Gene Therapy and of Pharmacogenetics, 5 VALUE IN HEALTH 5, 9 (2002) (payers are
likely to bargain hard to contain drug price increases linked to genetic tests).
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than α0. Profit grows with the fraction that is informed when α is sufficiently large (i.e.,
greater than α0).
TS, Π

TS

TS = Π
Π

α
0

α0

α′

1

Figure 1

The effect of the information from genetic testing on profits is easy to understand.
Better information has a negative effect on profit because the bad matches drop out of the
market.42 Better information also has a positive effect on profit; the good matches have a
higher valuation than the uninformed patients do, and when there are enough good
matches the seller raises the price. Figure 1 shows that profit falls for α ≤ α0 because the
price is fixed at V/2, and the only effect of genetic testing is that sales are lost to bad
matches. For α ≥ α0, profit rises with α because only good matches buy the drug at the
price of V, and increasing genetic testing increases the fraction of patients who know they
are good matches. The fraction α′ ≡ (V – 2C)/(V – C) shown in Figure 1 indicates the
positive fraction of informed patients that yields the same level of profit achieved when
no patients are informed. When α > α′, genetic testing increases profit because the
positive influence of the price increase is greater than the negative influence of lost sales.
Economists measure the social value derived from the drug market by adding
consumer surplus to profit; this sum is called total surplus. Figure 1 displays the total
surplus as a function of the fraction of patients who get genetic testing. The total surplus
in the drug market is easy to calculate. Consumer surplus is zero when the price equals V,
because only good matches buy the drug, and the price equals their valuations. Therefore,
total surplus equals profit when α ≥ α0. For smaller values of α there is positive
consumer surplus. Uninformed patients do not get any consumer surplus at a price of V/2
42

The negative effect of lost sales on profit is mitigated because the seller avoids the cost of making the
drug for bad matches.
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because that price equals their valuation. Bad matches do not get any surplus because
they do not buy the drug. But good matches get consumer surplus equal to V – V/2. Thus
the expected consumer surplus when α ≤ α0 is α/2 (V/2) = αV/4. Total surplus when α ≤
α0 is:
TS = V/2 – (1 – α/2) C.
Total surplus increases with the fraction of informed patients except for a
discontinuous drop at α = α0. Total surplus drops at the point where the seller switches
from a relatively low price of V/2 to the higher price of V. The drop is large enough that
total surplus in the interval (α0, α′) is lower than total surplus when α = 0. The
availability of genetic testing has an obvious positive effect on total surplus; testing leads
to better matching of patients with drug treatment. The social gain from testing is offset
by the seller’s response to testing — a price increase. The price increase excludes the
uninformed patients from the market and causes a social loss. Either the positive or
negative effect may predominate so total surplus may either rise or fall after genetic
testing is introduced.
The surprising results from the previous analysis are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The introduction of genetic testing reduces profit on the interval (0, α′),
and it reduces total surplus on the interval (α0, α′).

Proposition 1 is helpful in thinking about the incentive effects of
pharmacogenomics. A drug maker in a market similar to the one in the model would
oppose the introduction of genetic testing unless the testing reaches a relatively large
fraction of the market. Intuitively, genetic testing causes profit to fall because of lost
sales. Profit only recovers to the level without testing when there are enough patients who
have been informed that they are a good match and so have a high valuation that leads to
a price increase. A social planner might also oppose the introduction of genetic testing
when the fraction of informed patients falls in the interval (α0, α′). Total surplus in this
interval is low because the output restriction caused by monopoly pricing is substantial
and more than offsets the benefit from better matching.43
B. The Information Content of the Test
The basic model assumed that the drug worked in exactly half of the patient
population. This subsection generalizes the basic model by assuming that some fraction θ
benefits from the drug and the remaining 1– θ get no benefit. Table Two displays the
probabilities and valuations associated with the three types of patients. Informed patients
who are a good match get a benefit of V, uninformed patients get an expected benefit of
The socially optimal policy is difficult to evaluate when α takes on other values. When α ≤ α0 ,
introducing the genetic test raises ex post total surplus, but reduces drug profit and might inefficiently
diminish the incentive to invent the patented drug. When α > α′, the social planner might oppose the
genetic test even though it raises total surplus because consumer surplus falls to zero, or because the
incentive to innovate is excessive.
43
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θV, and bad matches get a benefit of 0. The fraction of uninformed patients is 1–α, the
fraction of good matches is αθ, and the fraction of bad matches is α(1-θ).

Probability
Valuation

Uninformed
1-α
θV

Good Match
αθ
V

Bad Match
α(1-θ)
0

Table Two

If θV ≥ C, then the basic model of the previous section applies, and the solid lines
in Figure 1 shows profit and total surplus.44 Profit initially falls in α, and grows when α ≥
α0. Total surplus equals profit when α ≥ α0, but diverges from profit when the fraction
informed is relatively small, i.e., α ≤ α0. Now suppose that a relatively small fraction of
patients gain a benefit from the drug, specifically, θV < C < V. In this case the drug
maker will not sell the drug if there is no genetic testing, because the expected value of
the drug to an uninformed patient is less than the marginal cost of the drug.45 Thus testing
is crucial to the sale of the drug. Given testing, the drug maker will set the price at V and
sell to the good matches. The seller captures all consumer surplus so profit and total
surplus are equal. The expression for profit is
π = αθ (V – C).
The bold line in Figure 1 and the solid continuation of that line represents both profit and
total surplus in this case.
An interesting policy issue arises from the relationship between the informational
value of a test and the magnitude of θ, the fraction of patients benefiting from the test.
The policy issue is captured by the question: How should the magnitude of θ affect public
sector support for genetic test R&D? One plausible response is that public support should
target drugs that can be used with a genetic test and cannot be used without a test, i.e.,
drugs such that θV < C < V. I think that response is mistaken. A better response considers
Price equals θV and profit equals (1 – α + αθ) (θV – C) if α ≤ α0 , and price equals V and profit equals
αθ(V – C) if α ≥ α0, where α0 is defined to be [θV – C]/[(2- θ) θV – C ].
45
A similar problem arises when side effects rather than efficacy are the issue. Some drugs are effective but
cause severe side effects in a small subset of the population. Such drugs cannot be used unless doctors have
a way to screen out patients who might suffer the side effects. Work is under way on a genetic test that can
screen out patients that could suffer fatal side effects from an AIDS drug. See Schoofs, supra note 14;
Jochen Duelli and Ashish Singh, Tailoring Drugs to Patient Gains Ground, BOSTON GLOBE, G5, June 30,
2002 (the drug Lotronex was linked to severe intestinal problems and some deaths, but the FDA has
allowed Glaxo-SmithKline to reintroduce the drug with patient restrictions based on pharmacogenomic
information) (the cancer drug Herceptin is designed exclusively for patients with multiple copies of the
HER-2/neu gene) (Glaxo is developing a genetic test that will identify the five percent of patients who
could suffer potentially fatal side effects from its AIDS drug Ziagen); Melody Petersen, Whistle-Blower
Says Marketers Broke the Rules to Push a Drug, N.Y. Times, March 14, 2002, available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/14/business/14DRUG.html (last visited March 14, 2002) (a whistleblower claims that Warner-Lambert marketed the drug Neurontin to doctors for more than a dozen
unapproved conditions) (doctors are allowed to prescribe medicines for uses not approved by the FDA, but
drug makers are not allowed to promote unapproved uses) (in 2000 seventy-eight percent of the
prescriptions for Neurontin were for off-label uses).
44
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two factors: whether the private sector has adequate incentive to develop the test; and the
informational value of the test. Intuitively, a genetic test has little informational value if θ
is close to zero, or if θ is close to one. If a drug is almost never effective for anyone, then
there is not much information revealed when a test is performed that indicates the drug
will not work for a specific patient. Similarly, not much information is revealed when the
drug is almost always effective, and a test shows that it is effective for a specific patient.
Rough intuition might suggest that the test is most informative when θ = ½. Actually, it
turns out the social value of a test is highest when θ = C/V, a fraction that is likely to be
much smaller than ½.
One measure of the social value of the test is the difference between total surplus
when every patient is tested and the total surplus when no patient is tested.46 That
difference is graphed in Figure 2 as a function of θ. The expression for the social value is
θ (V-C) when θ < C/V. This is simply the expected value of the drug when it is
administered to every patient who can benefit from it. The expression for social value is
(1- θ) C when θ ≥ C/V. This is simply the expected cost saving gained when the drug is
not given to patients who cannot benefit from it.47 The two expressions differ because in
the first case when there is no testing the drug is not marketed, but in the second case
when there is no testing the drug is sold to everyone. The social value grows with the
probability that the drug is effective for small values of θ, and it falls in relation to that
probability for large values of θ.
∆TS

θ
0

C/V

1
Figure 2

The result displayed in Figure 2 supports a policy that targets genetic tests
designed for drugs that work for a fraction of the patient population θ ≈ C/V, not a policy
46

A more complicated measure is required when I relax the assumptions that the genetic test is costless and
will be used by the entire patient population.
47
Generally, a social benefit occurs if the marginal cost of drug therapy is greater than the marginal cost of
the genetic test.
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that targets tests with θ < C/V.48 Thus, policymakers should not target drugs simply
because they can only be used with a test. Instead, they should target drugs such that the
genetic test yields the greatest social value. Figure 2 is helpful in identifying such tests,
but it does not capture all the relevant factors. Obviously, the size of the patient
population matters as much as the fraction of the population that can be helped. Further,
the analysis should incorporate distributional concerns about providing treatment for
small patient groups. The distributional concerns are well articulated in the analogous
context of orphan drug policy.49 Finally, government intervention is not warranted within
the framework of this model unless the private incentive to develop genetic tests falls
short of the socially optimal incentive. I will defer discussion of that issue until Section
III.B.
C. Tests with No Medical Value
In my second refinement of the basic model, I suppose that every patient gains a
benefit from the use of the patented drug, but some patients are a good match and they
get a large benefit V, and other patients are a bad match and they get a smaller benefit W
> C. The valuations and probabilities of each type of patient are displayed in Table 3.
Probability
Valuation

Uninformed
1–α
(V+W)/2

Good Match
α/2
V

Bad Match
α/2
W

Table Three

A test that informs patients whether they are a good or bad match has no “medical
value” in this case in the sense that it is socially desirable for every patient to take the
drug.50 But a test has economic value to certain patients because it gives them private
information that allows them to extract surplus from the seller. The drug patent owner has
an incentive to block the development of this sort of test.51
There are three different profit maximizing prices in this case depending on what
fraction of patients are informed. If the fraction of informed patients is relatively small,
48

Implementing this policy depends on the government’s ability to measure θ and the other relevant
variables. I suspect a good estimate of θ is possible given data on the fraction of patients that respond to a
drug.
49
Commentators have raised the related question of whether the orphan drug statute should be used to
promote drug discovery to serve “orphan genotypes.” See Mark A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffin Epps,
Ethical and Legal Implications of Pharmacogenomics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 228 (2001)
(questioning whether orphan drug statutes should cover drugs intended to treat uncommon genotypes); Arti
K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Distributive Justice, and Orphan Drugs: The Role of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 19 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY (2002) (discussing the role of genomic data in segregating
patient populations in smaller disease categories thereby increasing the problem of sustaining research
directed toward diseases affecting rare genotypes); Noah, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing orphan
genotypes).
50
Andrew Pollack, supra, note 18 (“In some cases, there are no treatments available. So genetic
fingerprinting may merely tell patients how quickly they can expect to die, without allowing doctors to do
anything about it.”)
51
Cf. Robertson et al., supra note 12, at 75 (drug patent owner may block development of genetic test).
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i.e., α ≤ α1, then the seller maximizes profit by choosing a price of (V+W)/2 and selling
to good matches and uninformed patients. Profit is
π = (1 – α/2) [(V+W)/2 – C].
If the fraction of informed patients is in an intermediate range so that α1 ≤ α ≤ α2, then
the seller maximizes profit by choosing a price of W and selling to all patients. Profit is
π = W – C.
If the fraction of informed patients is relatively large, i.e., α2 ≤ α ≤ 1, then seller
maximizes profit by choosing a price of V and selling only to good matches. Profit is
π = α/2 (V – C).
The critical values of α are given by the following expressions.

α1 =

2(V – W)
V + W – 2C

α2 =

2(W - C)
V–C

I assume that α2 < 1, i.e., V – W < W – C, otherwise setting a price of V is never optimal.
TS, Π

TS
TS
Π = TS

Π
Π

α
0

α1

α2
Figure 3

1

Figure 3 displays profit and total surplus as a function of the fraction of patients
who are informed. Notice that profit is maximized when none of the patients is informed.
Profit falls for small values of α because bad matches drop out of the market and the
price is fixed at (V + W)/2. For intermediate values ofα, profit is not sensitive to the
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fraction of patients who are informed because every patient purchases regardless of test
results when the price is W. For large values of α, profit rises as more patients are
informed because only good matches purchase at the price of V.
Total surplus maximization in this case simply requires that all patients buy and
use the drug. Total surplus is maximized when no patients are informed and the price is
set at a level such that they all purchase.52 Total surplus is also maximized when an
intermediate fraction of the patients are informed, α1 ≤ α ≤ α2, and the seller chooses a
price of W and sells to all patients. Consumer surplus is maximized for intermediate
values of α, because all patients buy the drug and the price is lower than for other values
of α. In contrast, consumer surplus is zero, when no patients are informed. These
observations reveal the antagonistic interests of patients and the drug patent owner in this
case. The drug patent owner wants to maximize the size of the pie and take all of that pie
by suppressing the genetic test. Patients might prefer to absorb the cost of developing and
deploying the therapeutically unnecessary test to increasing their bargaining power
against the drug seller.
D. Differentiated Drugs in a Duopoly Market
The model in this section features two drugs available to treat a certain population
of patients. One drug, labeled A, is more effective or safer for half of the population, and
the other drug B is better for the other half of the population. A test is available that will
inform patients whether they are better matched with drug A or B.53 Suppose that a good
match bestows a benefit V, and a bad match gives no benefit. The valuations and
probabilities of each type of patient are displayed in Table Four.
Probability
Valuation of A
Valuation of B

Uninformed
1–α
V/2
V/2

Good Match A
α/2
V
0

Good Match B
α/2
0
V

Table Four

I will analyze the effect of a genetic test on prices, profits, and total surplus in a
duopoly market for drugs A and B. Suppose that one firm has a patent on drug A and
another firm has a patent on drug B. Suppose the firms simultaneously set the price for
the two drugs given that some fraction α of the patients will take the genetic test.
52

When price P = (V + W)/2, consumer surplus is derived by good matches. Each good match gets utility
of V – P = (V – W)/2, so the expected consumer surplus is (α/2)(V – W)/2, and total surplus is just the sum
of consumer surplus and profit. When P = W, consumer surplus is derived by good matches and
uninformed patients. Each good match gets utility of V – P = V – W. Each uninformed patient gets utility of
(V + W)/2 – P = (V – W)/2. Expected consumer surplus is (α/2)(V – W) + (1 - α)(V – W)/2 = (V-W)/2.
Since profit π = W – C, total surplus equals (V + W)/2 – C.
53
For a possible example see Alison Davis, News Release, First Awards Made in NIH Effort to Understand
How Genes Affect People's Responses to Medicines, April 4, 2000, available at:
http://www.nigms.nih.gov/news/releases/pharmacogenetics.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) (an NIH grant
is funding research to discover which genes affect widely variable responses to the three main types of
asthma drugs).
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Uninformed patients get equal expected value from drugs A and B. Informed patients
strongly prefer the drug that is a good match for them. An article by Meurer and Stahl
characterizes the Nash equilibrium for this problem.54
Proposition 2. If the fraction of informed patients is large enough, i.e., α ≥ α0, then both
sellers choose a price PA = PB = V, and profit for each firm is

π = (α/2) (V – C).
If the fraction of informed patients is lower, α ≤ α0, then the sellers choose prices from a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, and the same expression represents expected
profit.55
Intuitively, when a large fraction of patients are informed each of the firms sell
only to patients who are a good match at the price of V. Neither firm is interested in
cutting its price to V/2 to sell to the uninformed patients. Such a price cut would increase
sales, but not enough to offset the lost revenue from the good matches. In contrast, when
the fraction of informed patients is lower the two firms waver between targeting just good
matches, and trying to capture the uninformed patients. The mixed strategy equilibrium
requires that each firm sets the price at V with the same positive probability, and
otherwise sets a price somewhere in an interval less than or equal to V/2. Each firm
introduces a random element into its pricing decision to avoid being easily undercut by its
rival.
TS, Π

TS

Π

α
0

α0

1

Figure 4
54

See Michael Meurer & Dale O. Stahl, Informative Advertising and Product Match, 12 INT’L J.
INDUSTRIAL ORG. 1 (1994).
55
Proof of results stated in this section and Figure 3 are contained in Meurer & Stahl. See id.
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Figure 4 displays the profit of a duopolist and the total surplus as a function of the
fraction of patients tested. Figures 1 and 3 both show that total surplus declines over an
intermediate range of values of α. The same explanation applies to the monopoly and
duopoly markets. As the fraction of untested patients declines, prices rise and the
untested patients are forced out of the market. For other values of α, total surplus grows
because increased testing leads to better matching of patients and drugs.
The private incentive to develop genetic tests is probably weaker in the duopoly
market depicted in this section than the monopoly market in section A.56 Testing has two
favorable effects on the profit of the duopolists. First, it increases sales by increasing the
number of good matches when the fraction tested is high. Second, it decreases
competition for untested patients when the fraction tested is low. But the private incentive
to develop tests is diminished by a classic free-riding problem. The value of the test flows
equally to the two firms in this model, and either firm would be tempted to delay test
development in hopes that its rival will provide the public good. A patent on the genetic
test is not likely to solve the free-riding problem. To see why, suppose firm A develops
and patents a test. Firm A cannot credibly commit to a policy that prohibits the use of the
test in conjunction with drug B, and at the same time, authorize use of the test in
conjunction with drug A. A physician that performs the test and finds out that a patient is
a good match with B and a bad match with A cannot deliberately forget the information,
and cannot ethically ignore it. Thus, the free-riding problem is likely to cause
underinvestment in genetic tests used to choose among substitute patented drugs.57
III. INCENTIVES TO CONDUCT AND DEVELOP GENETIC TESTS
A. The Incentive to Conduct Genetic Testing
Section II reveals that the rate of adoption of genetic tests has subtle and
significant effects on profit in complementary drug markets. In some markets, the rate of
adoption will be one hundred percent,58 but in other markets adoption will be slowed
many factors. Tort law, cost containment concerns of health care purchasers, and norms
of good medical practice will encourage testing.59 Optimists expect that physicians will
rapidly embrace pharmacogenomics and it will soon be incorporated into the standard
diagnostic repertoire. Laggards would be encouraged to embrace genetic testing for fear
56

An interesting topic for future research is the incentive to develop genetic tests for use in markets with
unpatented drugs. I conjecture that the test developer could capture a larger share of the surplus generated
by the test when the drug market is relatively competitive.
57
The firms might overcome the free riding problem by jointly developing the test, or if allowed by
antitrust law, by jointly marketing the test and their drugs.
58
Certainly, testing will always be done when it screens out patients who would suffer lethal side effects.
59
See Buchanan, et al., supra note 1, at 4 (payers are likely to embrace genetic tests that reduce
expenditures on drugs); Danzon & Towse, supra note 41, at 8-9 (willingness to pay for testing depends on
health benefit from treatment and avoiding adverse reactions and the cost of testing); See Rothstein & Epps,
supra note 49 (“[E]thical concerns, economic considerations and the threat of malpractice liability are
likely to encourage physicians to begin testing for and prescribing medications designed for use by specific,
smaller groups of individuals…[but] budgetary constraints imposed by insurers could slow acceptance of
drugs developed through pharmacogenomics…”).
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of a malpractice claim.60 In a promising example, Danzon and Towse document
significant savings to health care payers from adoption of a genetic test used in
conjunction with drug treatment of a particular form of breast cancer.61 But skeptics warn
that the pharmacogenomic revolution will be slowed by limited insurance coverage,62
privacy concerns, 63 and physician resistance or inertia.64 Further impediments will be
created by the high cost of developing and implementing the new tests, and by the
proliferation of costly new tailored drugs.65 Optimists respond that the cost of testing is
likely to fall as the industry gains experience in making and performing tests, and there
are likely to be economies of scale and scope in testing.66
Industry participants will surely influence the rate of adoption to advance their
goals. Generally, health care payers and drug companies have divergent interests in
promoting genetic tests. In some markets, both groups will favor tests, in some markets
drug companies will resist tests, and in other markets health care payers will resist tests.
In existing markets with a single patented drug, drug companies will push for complete
adoption of tests that accomplish useful sorting at a marginal cost less than the marginal
cost of the drug. Looking back to Figure 1, we see that drug company profit is maximized
when all patients are tested.67 Drug companies are apt to promote the test by marketing to
physicians and perhaps bundling tests with drugs.68 Figure 1 also shows that consumer
surplus is maximized when the fraction of patients tested is α0 < 1.69 Thus, a managed
care organization or other party acting to maximize consumer surplus might prefer
60

Possible tort liability for failure to warn about drug risks will push pharmacists and drug companies to
encourage pharmacogenomic medicine. See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 49.
61
See Danzon & Towse, supra note 41, at 11 (The FDA has approved three diagnostic tests that indicate
whether a patient will benefit from the chemotherapy drug trastuzumab. The cost is less than $100 per
test.).
62
See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 49 (questioning the extent of insurance coverage related to
pharmacogenomic drug therapy); Rai, supra note 11, at 202 (many Medicare beneficiaries do not have
prescription drug coverage).
63
See ANDREWS, ET AL., supra note 23, at 430-31 (discussing privacy risks of genetic testing associated
with pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics).
64
See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 16; Noah, supra note 13, at 22-23 (physicians may be slow to accept
pharmacogenomics).
65
One factor that might contribute to high testing cost is the need to obtain upstream gene patent licenses to
perform tests. High cost of license to perform test for breast cancer related genes, and gene related to
Canavan’s disease. The analysis in Section II.A shows that the price of currently available drugs might also
rise. Noah, supra note 13, at 27 (payers may not be enthusiastic about pharmacogenomics).
66
See Scientific American, supra note 30 (“Affymetrix expects to be able to mill through 100,000 SNPs
dispersed through a patient's genome in several hours, for as little as a few hundred dollars.”); Pollack,
supra note 18 (“Some scientists say the gene chips may be too expensive and difficult to use in the average
clinic. But others say the tests will come down to a few hundred dollars apiece. While powerful computers
may be needed to find the patterns initially, once they are found a sample can be analyzed on a laptop. And
the number of genes that need be tested may also shrink. Merck started out analyzing 25,000 genes but
found that only 70 were needed to predict breast cancer outcome.”)
67
Similarly, drug companies will promote widespread adoption of tests that bring a drug to the market that
has been shelved because of adverse reactions or low rates of efficacy.
68
See Robertson et al., supra note 12, at 159. Cf. Iain Cockburn, Comments on: The Proper Scope of IP
Rights in the Post-Genomics Era (by Arti K. Rai), B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. (2001) (genomics may disrupt
current drug marketing practices).
69
That value of α maximizes the difference between total surplus and profit. Notice that α0 also minimizes
profit. The interest of the drug company and consumers are strongly opposed.
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limited adoption of genetic testing.70 In contrast, when the genetic test is not medically
necessary because all patients will take the drug regardless of the test outcome then drug
companies will oppose tests because the tests give health care payers information that
augments their bargaining power against drug companies in the market for drugs. Genetic
tests might not diffuse as widely in markets with patented substitutes or markets with
unpatented drugs because the test seller does not (fully) internalize the increased profit
from drug sales. If the test seller cannot bundle the test with the complementary drugs,
then it will set a price above marginal cost that will slow test adoption.
B. The Incentive to Develop Genetic Tests
The genetic tests required for customized drug therapy will be costly to develop,
thus it is important to consider whether the private sector has an adequate development
incentive. Drug innovators have a strong incentive to develop genetic tests because the
tests are likely to reduce the cost of clinical trials for new drugs.71 If pharmacogenomics
becomes an essential step in drug discovery, then drug patent owners will routinely
develop complementary genetic tests.72 It is less clear whether incentives are adequate for
tests that are designed for use with existing drugs. Typically, patents on tests provide
adequate incentives, but patents fail to provide adequate incentives under certain market
conditions and public support should supplement private sector R&D. I evaluate the
adequacy of private incentives by comparing the private costs and benefits to the social
costs and benefits of test development. Private costs diverge from social costs mostly
because of licensing fees. Private benefits diverge from social benefits for reasons related
to the structure of the market for drugs, the structure of the market for genetic tests, and
the rate of adoption of tests.
The private cost of developing a genetic test includes both the transfer payments
required to license relevant patents and gain access to genomic databases, and the real
costs associated with research personnel, instruments and material.73 The social cost of
developing a test excludes transfer payments related to patent licenses and database
access. The firm views a wealth transfer as a cost but it is not a social cost because it does
not consume resources. Thus, private and social costs are equal only when transfer
payments are zero. Patents on research tools could add significantly to the cost of
70

Managed care organizations are likely to weigh the costs and benefits of using any diagnostic test. Cf.
Muin J. Khoury & Jill Morris, Pharmacogenomics and Public Health: The Promise of Targeted Disease
Prevention, available at: http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/info/factshts/pharmacofs.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2002) (discussing a cost-benefit analysis of testing for the factor V Leiden allele, which is associated with
an elevated risk of venous thrombosis among women who take oral contraceptives).
71
See Danzon & Towse, supra note 41, at 10.
72
But Sections II.A and II.C show that the innovator may suppress the tests if they are not medically useful
or if they will not be widely adopted.
73
A likely regulatory cost arises from FDA oversight of genetic tests. See Michael J. Malinowski & Robin
J.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services: The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot
Cards, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1211, 1229-32 (1997) (describing FDA regulation of predictive genetic test kits and
services); Buchanan, supra note 1, at 6. In the future, the economically relevant cost to develop a genetic
test may be quite low, because the information required for the genetic test will be produced during the
normal course of drug development. In other words, since pharmacogenomic information will be gathered
as part of an efficient drug development project, then that same information can be used at no cost during
the development of genetic testing. See Rai, supra note 10, at 191.
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pharmacogenomic research.74 For example, gene patents owners are likely to collect
royalty payments from companies who make gene chips used to predict adverse drug
reactions.75 The research exemption in patent law is very limited and will not diminish
these costs,76 and pharmacogenomics is outside the reach of the limitations imposed on
enforcement of medical process patents.77 It is possible, though, that these patent
licensing costs are overstated.78 Many existing gene patents may not survive validity
challenges.79 And many genes are unpatentable because of gene sequence data placed in
the public domain.80 License fees required for access to genomic databases could also add
significantly to development cost.81 The high fixed cost of producing a database means
that the market is not competitive,82 but prices are constrained by the existence of nonprofit databases,83 relatively weak intellectual property protection,84 and the possibility of
entry.
74

See Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (commenting on high
transaction costs associated with obtaining patent rights for gene chip); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ReExamining the Role Of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L. J. 783, 6-9
(2000) (genomics companies aim to protect information rather than molecules with their gene patents);
Andrew Pollack, 3-D RNA Folds and Molds Like a Key for a Specialized Work, N. Y. Times (Jan. 21,
2002) available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/21/science/21SHAP.html (discover of aptamers
(short strands of RNA that interact with proteins) believes basic research on aptamers has been slowed
because of his reluctance to license his patent); Philippe Ducor, New Drug Discovery Technologies and
Patents, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369, 388 (1996) (“A cursory search of U.S. patent titles
pertaining to such screening methods identified over forty-two issued patents in the past three years alone, a
tally that does not account for patents which may claim such methods without stating so in their titles.”);
Rebecca Eisenberg, The Shifting Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 19 Health Affairs 119, 127
(2001) (Merck supports the SNPs consortium to reduce the number of upstream patents and avoid licensing
costs); Rebecca Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, [This book] (2003) (reach through licenses and
claims are used by upstream gene patent owners to gain downstream revenue); See Rai, supra note 23, at
816-17 (drug developers need to get licenses to SNP patents to develop certain targeted drugs).
75
See id. at 842.
76
See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
856 (1984). The 271(e) research exemption is limited to research designed to gather data related to FDA
regulation. See Mueller, supra note 74, at 25-27. For a full discussion of the research exemption, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).
77
See Nunnally, supra note 21, at 20 (2001).
78
See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science – A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 701-03 (2001).
79
The utility requirement is likely to be a problem for many gene patents. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519 (1966). Gene patent claims that are valid may be read narrowly so that downstream genetic test
developers are not infringers. See Kieff, supra note 78, at 700 (EST patents could be read narrowly).
80
See Rai, supra note 23, at 832-33 (pharmaceutical companies are building public domain genomic
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The private benefit from developing a genetic test depends on the structure of the
market for the drug or drugs that are used in conjunction with the test. In many markets,
only a drug patent owner would pursue development of a genetic test designed for use
with a patented drug.85 The patent owner could deter competing innovators by
threatening a patent infringement suit, if developing the genetic test requires use of the
patented drug. Furthermore, the patent owner enjoys cost advantages in developing a
genetic test because of access to the drug and patients’ genetic information acquired
during clinical testing.86
The benefit to a drug patent owner from developing a genetic test is the sum of
the profit from selling the test plus the increase in profit from sale of the drug that is used
in conjunction with the test. If the drug is not currently marketed, then the patent owner
has a strong incentive to develop a genetic test that would get the drug on the market.87
For example, a drug might be kept off the market because of adverse reactions. A test
might allow doctors to screen out patients who are likely to suffer an adverse reaction,
making the drug marketable. If the drug is already marketed, then the drug patent owner
may gain or lose from the introduction of the genetic test. Section II shows that the profit
from drug sales depends on the fraction of the patient population that is tested. For
example, if the test is not medically useful, then testing always hurts profit. If testing is
medically useful, then testing every patient maximizes monopoly profit.88 In contrast, if
the fraction tested is less than α′ as displayed in Figure 1, then even medically useful
genetic testing cuts profit for drugs that are already marketed. To achieve a high rate of
testing the firm should set a low price on the genetic test, and capture its profit through
the price of the drug.89 In fact, the firm should offer the test free of charge to promote
widespread adoption. The test and the drug are complements and patients care about the
total expected price of drug therapy not the separate prices of testing and drugs.
Essentially, genetic testing plays a role similar to advertising. Just as a firm offers
advertising information at no charge, it should offer the testing information at no charge
in order to gain a favorable change in the demand for the drug.90

Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992). But Congress has considered establishing new
intellectual property rights that apply to databases. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 58, at 95-112
(1997) (explaining forces that push the United States toward adoption of a database statute).
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benefit of V. In a more realistic model with heterogeneous valuations, the drug company would not capture
all the consumer surplus from introducing the drug, and therefore, profit would be less than total surplus.
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from developing the genetic test is C/2. Intuitively, testing increases profit because it allows the firm to
avoid the cost of making and selling drugs to patients who will not benefit from the drugs.
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90
Drug companies might be constrained by antitrust concerns. See Noah, supra note 13, at 21-22
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The private benefit from test development equals the social benefit when the test
developer captures the increase in total surplus caused by adoption of the test. Sections
II.A and B suggest drug patent owners will effectively capture the social benefit from test
development when medically useful tests are widely adopted. In contrast, when the
fraction of patients tested is relatively low there can be wide divergence between the
private and social benefit. For example, Figure 1 shows profit declines while total surplus
grows from test introduction when the fraction of patients tested is less than α0. Section
II.C shows that there is no social benefit from development and introduction of tests that
are not medically necessary. For such tests, private and social benefits are equal and
maximized when no patients are tested and no test is developed. Section II.D shows that
the private benefit from test introduction falls short of the social benefit in duopoly
markets. The free rider problem discourages firms from developing a test used in
conjunction with substitute patented drugs owned by different firms.
Finally, consider test development incentives when multiple firms race to get a
patent on a test.91 This problem is outside the scope of the model in Section II, but two
points deserve comment. First, the expected profit from the test is lower because the
profit is discounted by the probability of winning the patent race, and because a genetic
test inventor who does not own the patent on the associated drug gets a smaller profit
than the drug patent owner could.92 Second, the expected profit from a patent on a genetic
test is more potent in stimulating R&D by firms in a patent race. It is possible the private
incentive to develop the genetic test exceeds the social incentive. This can be true even
though the expected profit from patenting a test is lower. The difference from the single
inventor case arises because firms are driven to win the winner-take-all patent race. A
social planner does not care which firm wins the race, but of course the firms care.
Therefore, even if the winner earns far less than the expected social value from
competing in the race, firms might invest more than the social optimum.
CONCLUSION
Federal subsidies and public sector research currently play significant roles
stimulating the development of the first generation of genetic tests designed to customize
drug therapy. If pharmacogenomics fulfills its promise, then we should expect that as this
sector of the pharmaceutical industry matures, most of the R&D on genetic tests will shift
to the private sector. Drug manufacturers have a strong incentive to develop tests during
the drug development process. They also have a strong incentive to develop tests that
allow them to market drugs that have been shelved because of adverse reactions or low
efficacy rates. Drug manufacturers and independent diagnostic manufacturers are apt to
91

Biotech firms are starting to enter this market. See Scientific American, supra note 30.
The test inventor can profit either by selling the test to patients or by assigning the patent to the drug
patent owner. Because the test and the drug used in conjunction with the test are complementary products,
assigning the genetic test patent to the drug patent owner is likely to be more profitable. The maximum
profit that the drug patent owner can derive from introducing a genetic test is C/2. That amount is the upper
bound on the profit available to an outside inventor who patents the genetic test. It is likely that the drug
patent owner and the inventor of the genetic test would share that amount, thus the private gain to the
inventor is lower than in the case when the drug patent owner is also the inventor of the genetic test. The
drug patent owner would market the test when profitable, but would still be willing to acquire the patent
and suppress the test if usage was unprofitable.
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play the leading role in developing genetic tests used in conjunction with drugs that are
currently marketed, but the presence of certain factors may dampen private incentives to
develop tests for existing drugs and require continued public sector participation in
genetic test R&D. The case for public subsidy is strongest when genetic tests are not
widely adopted, when tests are designed for use with substitute drugs manufactured by
different companies, or when the private cost of test development is high because of
licensing costs.
Public sector support for development of genetic tests can take many different
forms. Presently, federal grants directly support public sector pharmacogenomic
research,93 and indirectly support pharmacogenomics through subsidies encouraging the
production of research inputs (like gene data) that are used in the development of genetic
tests.94 The government can encourage adoption of genetic tests through drug law and
health insurance regulation.95 Finally, the drug laws may be used to subsidize the
development of drugs designed to treat “orphan genotypes.”96 An interesting question for
future research is the optimal mix of these subsidies.
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95
See Rai, supra note 11, at 203-05 (Pharmacogenomics will put pressure on the federal government to
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96
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of some diseases). Drug companies may not be willing to develop new drugs to treat small patient groups
who have a rare genotype. See Danzon & Towse , supra note 41, at 12 (socially valuable genetic tests may
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